We show that standard statistical tests of OPEC behavior have very low power across a wide range of alternative hypotheses regarding market structure. Consequently, it is difficult, given the current availability and precision of data on demand and costs, to distinguish collusive from competitive behavior in the world oil market. This, along with other factors, may account for the largely inconclusive nature of findings so far reported in the empirical literature on OPEC. We apply a new approach for examining alternative hypotheses and find strong evidence of cooperative behavior among OPEC members. Our results also suggest that OPEC's formal quota mechanism, introduced in 1982 to replace a system based on posted prices, increased transactions costs within the organization. We do not find strong evidence to support the view that Saudi Arabia has played the role of dominant producer within the cartel. (JEL: D43, L11, L13, Q41)
Inscrutable OPEC? Behavioral Tests of the Cartel Hypothesis

I. Introduction
Since OPEC achieved its considerable notoriety in the early 1970s, substantial public interest and numerous scholarly investigations have focused on the collective decisions and economic impact of this particularly long-lived association of sovereign oil producers. Conflicting interpretations of OPEC and its influence have been advanced, each built from a different blend of the principles of competitive, collusive, and monopolistic behavior. Whether OPEC is viewed as a benign, potent, or simply highly erratic influence on the market depends largely on the choice among these several competing perspectives and the assumptions that frame them.
The competing OPEC stories find substantial support in different quarters. One can cite bits and pieces of evidence that are consistent with each of the various hypotheses, and that have been used to rationalize the conflicting points of view and sustain debate. Having surveyed the first decade of OPEC research, Gately (1984) concluded that it remained "an open question how best to design a model of the behavior of OPEC." Hoping to steer subsequent research efforts in a direction that might help to narrow the field, Griffin (1985, p. 954) pointed to one fundamental problem:
The standard practice to date has been to reach onto the shelf of economic models, to select one, to validate its choice by pointing to selected events not inconsistent with the model's predictions, and then to proceed with some normative exercise. (emphasis added) As Griffin realized, evidence that is "not inconsistent" with a particular point of view is hardly conclusive, and certainly not a proper basis for choosing between the alternatives.
Knowledge increases only when research uncovers evidence that is inconsistent with one or more hypotheses, not by tabulating bits of evidence that are consistent with a selected point of view.
1 This is an important distinction in the current context because, as shown below, behavioral models of OPEC from the entire spectrum of market structures give many predictions that are indistinguishable from one another, at least at the level of empirical certitude that characterizes the world oil market. The consequence, as I argue below, is that much of the evidence that has been cited regarding OPEC's behavior is mutually consistent with a wide range of apparently conflicting models. Thus, Griffin's plea that researchers begin to search more systematically for information that would distinguish one hypothesis from another, not simply to compile data that appears to "support" an individual hypothesis considered in isolation.
II. Notes on the Literature
The subsequent empirical literature, which includes Griffin's (1985) own path breaking inquiry plus a series of worthy contributions by Loderer (1985) , Geroski, Ulph, and Ulph (1987) , Green (1988) , Jones (1990) , Dahl and Yücel (1991) , Griffin and Nielson (1994) , Gülen (1996) , Gault, et. al. (1999) , Huettner (2000a & 2000b) , Spilimbergo (2001) , and Ramcharran (2002) , remains largely inconclusive regarding the behavior and impact of OPEC despite the best efforts of those authors. Few interesting hypotheses have been rejected and therefore little has been clarified regarding OPEC's actual or intended influence on the market. Behavioral patterns are sometimes discernable, but those that have been found tend to be consistent with multiple hypotheses.
2 1 This criticism was central to Stigler's (1964) attack upon those "immortal theories" of the industrial organization literature that defied falsification for lack of testable hypotheses. 2 This review covers only the "econometric" portion of the empirical literature (i.e., studies that primarily apply statistical analysis to quantifiable market data) because that approach is the subject of my own For example, Gülen (1996, p. 43) looks for indications that the output levels of individual OPEC members tend to move in parallel because, as he notes: "If OPEC was an effective cartel sharing the market among its members, there would be a long-run relationship between each member's production and total OPEC output." But, although parallel movement is not inconsistent with the cartel hypothesis, neither is it inconsistent with the competitive hypothesis since the output levels of perfectly competitive firms should be expected to move together in response to demand shocks and systematic cost fluctuations that impact the entire industry. Gülen's search, therefore, is for evidence that would at best be inconclusive. Griffin (1985, p. 957 ) also noted the empirical tendency for parallel movement among OPEC members' production levels and interpreted parallelism as evidence that OPEC is a "real cartel with at least partially effective output coordination." The same critique applies, however: circumstances that would induce cartel members to increase or decrease their outputs in concert (i.e., demand and cost fluctuations) would also induce perfectly competitive firms to "coordinate" their output levels. 3 How to distinguish the two empirically? Alhajji and Huettner (2000b) focus on the estimated price elasticity of demand for OPEC (or alternatively, Saudi) oil, noting in particular that a monopolist would not choose to operate on the inelastic portion of its demand curve. Thus, estimated demand elasticities numerically below -1 would constitute evidence not inconsistent with the cartel hypothesis. Neither would such results be inconsistent with the perfectly competitive hypothesis, however, since it is quite easy to envision market conditions inquiry. Many important insights have come from the case study approach; a literature that includes numerous works carefully distilled from close observation and richly detailed assessments of the diverse aspects (qualitative as well as quantitative) that characterize OPEC and its membership. Notable recent under which a perfectly competitive industry comes to equilibrium at a point on the upper half of the demand curve (i.e., where market demand is elastic).
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As further example of the ambiguity of market predictions, consider Libecap's (1989) hypothesis, also later employed by Dahl and Yücel (1991) , that so-called "swing"
producers (such as the Texas Railroad Commission in Libecap's context or Saudi Arabia and/or the cartel "core" for Dahl and Yücel) should be expected to exhibit larger proportionate changes in production than the rest of the market. The whole production of an individual swing producer is vulnerable, after all, to relatively small percentage fluctuations in aggregate output from the rest of the group. On this basis, a high coefficient of variation in individual output, compared to the market as a whole, would constitute evidence not inconsistent with the status of a swing producer. On the other hand, neither is a high coefficient of variation inconsistent with the status of a perfectly competitive producer. For example, if output variations of all producers are essentially random (e.g., governed by weather, unpredictable drilling results, unscheduled maintenance, etc.), then the coefficient of variation for individual producers will necessarily exceed that of the group as a whole (because relative to the random fluctuations in output, the group enjoys greater benefits of diversification than the examples include the works by Adelman (1995 and , Amuzegar (1999) , Claes (2001 ), Mitchell et. al. (2001 ), and Kohl (2002 . Mabro (1998) surveys a much wider swath of the OPEC literature. 3 Alhajji and Huettner (2000a, page 126) have previously noted this ambiguity. 4 Alhajji and Huettner (2000b, p. 45 ) actually claim to have rejected the hypothesis that OPEC's demand elasticity is less than -1, which as they indicate would constitute evidence that "OPEC is not a profitmaximizing cartel." (emphasis added) Their reported result does not, however, rule out the possibility that OPEC might be acting as a cautious or restrained cartel; i.e., raising the market price somewhat, but not to the full degree of a profit-maximizing monopolist. In other words, the elasticity-based test must in principle be inconclusive on the question of whether OPEC has affected the market price. As it happens, Alhajji and Huettner's statistical rejection of the elasticity hypothesis appears to have been in error (see discussion below), so the question is moot.
individual producer). 5 The same would be true in any competitive industry to the extent that random output fluctuations at the level of the individual producer are significant.
How then to distinguish the swing producer from the competitive producer?
Separately, Dahl and Yücel (1991, p. 126) observe that low-cost producers in a profit-maximizing cartel would be expected to produce more than high-cost producers,
and that an indicator of marginal cost should therefore enter significantly (and negatively) into the production equation for cartel members, a result which they find in the data. However, the same volumetric relationships-low-cost producers dominating high-cost producers-would be expected to hold among perfectly competitive producers, and therefore the pattern of evidence is again consistent with models located at opposite ends of the economic spectrum and the results are inconclusive.
As further evidence of the limited power to distinguish among alternative OPEC hypotheses, we cite the study by Gault, et. al. (1999) of OPEC's apportionment of its total output target among individual members; i.e., the determination of individual quotas. Although the authors were able to form a preference for certain models over others on the basis of parsimony, none of the four tested models of quota assignments were statistically inconsistent with the data.
Thus, despite a continuing series of statistical investigations that carefully scrutinize pricing impacts as well as production decisions, the empirical literature has failed to produce clear evidence regarding the nature of OPEC behavior, whether 5 Let there be N producers in the industry. Denote the i th producer's output level q i , with mean µ and variance σ 2 . If output fluctuations are assumed to be independent, aggregate output is then given by Q = Σq i , with mean Nµ and variance Nσ 2 . By definition, the coefficient of variation of an individual firm's output level is c = σ/µ, and for the industry it must be C = √Nσ/Nµ = c/√N < c. 6 On purely theoretical grounds, output allocations to individual members should vary inversely with the average cost of production, whereas marginal costs should be equalized in order to minimize the total cost competitive or otherwise. There are some notable individual exceptions, of courseinstances where particular researchers have been able to reject one model or hypothesis in favor of another. However, the pattern of such rejections is sparse and confined for the most part to the domain of highly specialized and therefore relatively uninteresting hypotheses. Griffin (1985) , for example, is able to reject the "constant market sharing" variant of the cartel hypothesis in ten of eleven instances, but this is an extreme proposition (i.e., members' take fixed shares in total output independently of the price level) that would characterize the production shares of a profit-maximizing cartel only by coincidence. In general, shares of cartel members should be expected to fluctuate with the price level in accordance with the differential elasticities of members' individual marginal cost schedules. 7 Griffin is not able to reject this more general variant of the cartel hypothesis in any of the eleven instances investigated. Jones (1990) , who extended Griffin's estimates to a later time period, finds essentially the same result. Griffin (1985) is also able to reject in all ten instances the "strict" version of the target revenue hypothesis (which maintains that producers vary production inversely with price to maintain a constant level of revenue commensurate with exogenous investment needs). However, the "partial" variant of this hypothesis, in which exogenous investment requirements are assumed to drive production, but to a lesser degree, can be rejected in only one of the ten instances. 8 The results of Dahl and Yücel (1991) , based on a larger sample of data, are consistent with Griffin: the strict version of the target revenue model of the cartel's output. In practical terms, however, there is enough ambiguity between empirical measures of average and marginal cost to perhaps overlook this distinction. 7 Of course, the shares of competitive producers would be expected to fluctuate similarly.
can be rejected in every instance, but the partial variant can never be. Alhajji and Huettner's (2000a) detailed examination of the target revenue hypothesis also finds it relatively easy to reject the extreme form, but much more difficult to reject the more plausible, "weak" forms of this model. Loderer's (1985) Two particularly enlightening empirical studies argue that OPEC's behavior varies over time-vacillating between cooperative and competitive modes, depending on circumstances-and therefore cannot be adequately described by any simple hypothesis. 9 Geroski, Ulph, and Ulph (1987) specify a partially altruistic objective function for each OPEC member that incorporates variable weights on its own profits and the profits of other members. Within this framework, the authors are able to reject the "constantbehavior" hypothesis, and moreover to demonstrate that observed actions conform roughly to the "tit-for-tat" game strategy (at least during their sample period of [1966] [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] , which is a time-varying combination of cooperative and competitive modes of behavior. Similarly, Griffin and Neilson (1994) find evidence that, subsequent to the oil price crash of [1985] [1986] , Saudi Arabia adopted a tit-for-tat production strategy that alternately disciplines and rewards other cartel members. While both of these studies advance considerably our comprehension of the richness and complexity of OPEC behavior, they also reinforce the notion that it is possible to find bits of behavioral evidence in the historical record that are consistent with a wide range of alternative hypotheses-therefore making it difficult to reject any.
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9 Clearly, the behavior of OPEC seems to vary over time, so models that do not assume a fixed posture have this in their favor. Whether that variation is systematic in some manner that can be captured within an economic model is another matter. 10 These findings bolster Adelman's long-held position that OPEC is an inconsistent, sometimes bumbling, sometimes cohesive, but always vacillating federation of producers. See, for example, Adelman (1980 Adelman ( , 1982 Adelman ( , 1995 Adelman ( , and 2002 .
Some Misreported Results
Apart from the results described above, a number of other inferences presented in previous studies are simply incorrect and must be discounted. Although it would be impossible to dissect each and every questionable inference to be found in this broad and diverse literature, a brief discussion of several misreported results may be instructive.
Spilimbergo (2001, page 349 and Table 3 ), for example, makes the elementary logical mistake of concluding that failure to reject his null hypothesis (i.e., that OPEC acts competitively) constitutes a rejection of the alternative. The proper interpretation is that his results are not strong enough to distinguish between the null hypothesis and its alternative, and therefore simply inconclusive. Dahl and Yücel (1991, page 121 and Table 1 ) commit the same error in reporting that the hypothesis of dynamic behavior (long-term planning horizon) among OPEC producers is "strongly rejected," when in fact their statistical result establishes only that the null hypothesis of non-dynamic behavior (short-term planning horizon) can not be rejected.
Alhajji and Huettner's (2000b) test of whether OPEC producers have exploited their market power by limiting output to the point where marginal cost equals marginal revenue is hampered at the outset by the authors' reliance on flawed cost estimates that would seem to misrepresent the level of marginal cost in each producing country, and their failure to account for the uncertainty that surrounds these estimates (cf. section III of this paper). 11 More troubling is the fact that the demand elasticities they report, and upon which their tests are built, are inconsistent with their estimated demand equations; and the corrected elasticity estimates would in most cases render inconclusive their reported rejections of the null hypothesis.
12 Dahl and Yücel (1991) and Gülen (1996) test the null hypothesis that production levels of OPEC members are not cointegrated, where rejection would imply that production levels tend to move together. It has already been noted, of course, that outputs might be expected to move together whether producers are competitive rivals or cartel collaborators, so rejection of the null hypothesis would leave matters quite unclear.
In any event, Dahl and Yücel are almost never able to reject the null hypothesis, which leaves matters equally unclear. Gülen is able to reject the null hypothesis more often, but the pattern of rejections (across time and countries) is still infrequent and erratic.
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Moreover, cointegration tests presume that production series from the respective regions are nonstationary-which is to say unbounded. The very foundation of this approach, themselves and it is only an illusion; and (c) the military expenditures of each country can be rationalized in part as protection to ensure the security of that nation's oil reserves and production facilities, but those expenditures remain the same whether output rises or falls by 10 percent; i.e., they are fixed rather than variable. 12 Alhajji and Huettner (2000b) estimate the elasticity of world oil demand (E w ) to be -0.251 and the elasticity of non-OPEC supply (E no ) to be 0.290 (see their Table 2 ). The elasticity of residual demand for OPEC oil (E o ) can then be inferred from the formula: E o = E w /s -E no (1-s)/s, where s = OPEC's share of world output. The authors report only a few of the computed values of E o , on which their tests are based. For example, they give the figure E o = -0.1644 for the first quarter of 1983 and claim that in no quarter was E o algebraically below -0.2209. By the preceding formula, their 1983 figure would imply that OPEC produced 119% of worldwide output (s = 1.19) during that quarter. Based on the values of E w and E no in their Table 2 and OPEC's actual market share for first quarter of 1983 (30.1% according to monthly production statistics of the U.S. Energy Information Administration), the correct value for the elasticity of residual demand for OPEC oil that quarter would be E o = -1.507 (not -0.1644 as reported). Small discrepancies in the reported elasticity might result from differences in quarterly market shares computed from consumption versus production data (the difference representing changes in inventories), but the apparent discrepancy here is too large to be accounted for in that manner. Corrected values for the elasticity of residual demand for OPEC oil during the authors' entire estimation period range from -1.66 to -0.67, and fall into the elastic range 58 percent of the time, including the entire subinterval from April 1981 to November 1992. These corrected values are more consistent with the results of Geroski, Ulph, and Ulph (1987, page 81) who in their earlier study found the elasticity of demand for OPEC oil to be close to or less than -1.00 after 1973.
therefore, hardly seems consistent with the physical manner in which oil resources are known to be found and produced. The statistical power of cointegration tests is also known to be low. Consider, for example, two producers: one whose production varies randomly over time within some fixed band, and another who makes periodic production adjustments that exactly offset the variations of the first. Although the second producer performs the role of swing producer perfectly, the cointegration approach would not detect it since neither production series is nonstationary, which precludes the cointegration test in the first place.
14 Green (1988) argues, but without providing any measure of statistical significance, that OPEC appears to act as a swing producer over the seasonal cycleraising production during the colder winter months when demand is peaking and reducing production during the remainder of the year. It is not clear why competitive producers should not be expected to respond similarly to these seasonal demand cycles, either through direct production increases or inventory liquidation, unless the cycles were fully anticipated and offset by the actions of the swing producer, of course. But further examination of the underlying data seems to remove that possibility and therefore to undermine Green's interpretation: Holding other things constant, OPEC's average production is lowest during the first two months of the year (see Green's Figure 1) , those being the months that are typically the coldest and which would (by Green's argument) provide the greatest scope for OPEC to increase its own output without upsetting the market price. Estimates of residual demand for OPEC oil by Geroski, Ulph, and Ulph (1987, p. 81) show the seasonal and temperature variables to be statistically insignificant in any event.
Finally, we must consider Griffin's (1985) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) , has been that each instance of significant price escalation has seen significant cost escalation too, as the rush of drilling activity drove factor prices upwards. The cost data that would control for this confounding effect were not available to Griffin, and therefore excluded from the estimated equation. Thus, it is not clear whether the reported rejections signify genuine deviations from competitive behavior or the impact of omitted variables. 15 Jones (1990) was able to reject the competitive hypothesis for only two of eleven OPEC members in between the value of reserves and the rate of reserve additions (of which two were significant), and six showed a negative relationship (again two were significant).
III. The Power to Distinguish Monopoly from Competition
One prediction that is hardly ambiguous is that the exercise of market powerwhether by a monopolist or a cartel-leads to a higher price than perfect competition.
Consider a group of producers who are suspected of colluding. In addition, let there be a "competitive fringe" of price-taking producers whose output supplements that of the suspected cartel. The question is whether it is possible to properly diagnose the actions of the cartel. We set forth the two possible extremes regarding their behavior:
H a : (perfect cartel-multi-plant monopoly);
where: Q r (P) = Q d (P) -Q f (P) (total demand less fringe supply)
15 This effect may be more pronounced in the U.S. than in the OPEC countries, and Adelman's (1992) results suggest that even in the U.S. its importance is moderated by other factors. In fairness, my results (reported later) tend to corroborate and strengthen Griffin's conclusions. 16 Ramcharran is able to reject only twice at the conventional 5% significance level. He reports a greater number of rejections, but upon inspection those are based on a looser standard.
This specification is a deliberate juxtaposition of the two most extreme hypotheses regarding market behavior; i.e., a contrast that is expected to generate the widest (and most easily discernable) difference in market prices and output levels.
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Even if the alternative hypothesis is true, the ability to reject the null depends on our having good estimates of marginal cost and the elasticity of residual demand. We cannot judge whether marginal cost lies closer to marginal revenue or price without empirical knowledge of these benchmarks. 18 Formally, the conventional one-sided test The power of this test is by definition the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis given that the alternative is true. Using E( MC ) to represent the expected value of the marginal cost estimate, we have: Levin (1988) outlines nonrestrictive conditions that ensure that the market price will ascend as we compare the perfectly competitive, Cournot, Stackelberg, and collusive monopoly equilibria. 18 Cartel members are assumed to charge a uniform price to all customers. Price discrimination might provide prima facie evidence of market power, but we leave that aside.
where the last step depends on the assumption that the cost estimate is normally distributed around its mean.
For purposes of benchmarking the power calculations, we may describe the precision of the marginal cost estimate in terms of the coefficient of variation (λ):
which permits the power to be written as:
Note that (1+ε r ) < 0 under the alternative hypothesis (the elasticity is not defined as an absolute value), and that Pr[z < −z α ] = α by definition, thus the power of the test can not drop below α. But, for the power to be substantially greater than α (which gives the probability of rejection due to mistaken judgment), the denominator of the right-hand term must be small. There are three conclusions, none surprising: Even under the favorable but unlikely assumption that members of the cartel never make pricing errors, the power to reject the competitive hypothesis is extremely low, at least under realistic assumptions regarding the structure of the world oil market and the precision of our cost estimates. This is evident from the portions of the power function that have been calculated from the previous equation and graphed in Figure 1 .
For purposes of this illustration, Saudi Arabia alone is assumed to constitute the "cartel core," with other OPEC members relegated to the competitive fringe.
In Figure 1 , the elasticity of world demand is assumed to be -0.5. 20 The elasticity of supply from the rest of the world (the aggregate of all non-Saudi production) is assumed to be +0.3, and the Saudi market share of total output is assumed to vary between 3% and 18% (roughly equivalent to its historical low and high). Finally, the precision (λ) of the estimate of Saudi marginal cost is permitted to vary between 0.l0 and 0.70. Panel A of the figure shows the power of a 5% significance level test, and reveals that a random sample is very unlikely to reject the null hypothesis of competitive pricing 19 On the other hand, if the cartel or monopolist misestimates the relevant demand elasticity, and systematically overshoots the optimal price, then the power to reject the competitive hypothesis would be enhanced. Adelman (1985, pp. 146-150) argues persuasively that this was true of OPEC during the 1970s. 20 A greater demand elasticity would only make matters worse for the power of the test since the effect of greater elasticity is to push the optimal monopoly price closer to the competitive level.
unless marginal cost is estimated with high precision (λ ≤ 0.3). The possibility of rejecting at the 1% significance level is really quite remote, as shown in Panel B.
One could hope, if the Saudi market share were at the very high end of the historical range, and if very exact estimates of marginal cost could be produced, that the 5% significance test could be counted on to reject the competitive hypothesis-if it is indeed false. The Saudi's average share, however, is roughly 12%. And the precision of marginal cost estimates seems best approximated by a coefficient of variation in the vicinity of 0.50. 21 Subject to these conditions, the ability to reject the competitive hypothesis, even if it were false, is extremely low-hardly greater than the probability of committing a Type-I error.
IV. Parallel Action and Patterns of Compensating Behavior
Whereas previous empirical work has been largely unsuccessful in distinguishing between market structures, here we apply some new tests that examine the question from a different perspective. This approach focuses on the prevalence of offsetting or "compensating" production changes among potential rivals. Compensating production behavior is the opposite of parallel action. One producer increasing output to offset the decline of another is an example of compensating behavior. Such behavior arises for different reasons, and with varied frequency, under alternative forms of market organization. By examining the comparative static properties of equilibrium output adjustments, Smith (2003) demonstrates that differences in the frequency of compensating output changes are systematically related to the degree of interdependence 21 Analysis of the estimates of marginal costs for OPEC members produced by Adelman and Shahi (1989) suggest that the coefficient of variation is roughly 0.50 (see appendix for explanation and derivation of this result).
among producers, which provides a means for distinguishing among competitive, oligopolistic, and collusive behavior.
The potential advantage of basing a test of market conduct on the degree of compensating behavior stems from two facts. First, the predicted frequency of offsetting changes varies systematically and provides an unambiguous ordering of the principal market structures, as indicated by the chain of inequalities above. Second, because this ordering is independent of the slopes of demand and marginal cost curves, statistical inferences based upon it will not be confounded by uncertainty regarding these background parameters. 23 Specifically, with respect to the producers of a homogeneous product, it can be shown that:
where the θ x represent the probability of observing offsetting production changes among producers operating under the respective market structures. These encompass the standard forms of rivalry, denoted as follows:
cartel:
A frictionless association of producers acting essentially as a multi-plant monopoly; allocating output to equalize the marginal cost of each producer with marginal revenue of the cartel.
be:
Bertrand-Edgeworth competition, in which rivals compete via pricing strategies that devolve in equilibrium to pricing at marginal cost.
stackelberg: The Stackelberg model is the dominant-firm variant of the Cournot hypothesis in which one firm acts as the "leader" and sets its output in correct anticipation of the reaction of the "fringe."
22 The limited power of performance-based tests is not confined to the world oil market. See Phlips ' (1996) comments on "indistinguishability" in his presidential address to the European Economic Association. 23 Libecap and Smith (forthcoming) examine compensating production changes on the part of Saudi Arabia as part of a broader inquiry into governmental policies towards oil production, but they do not extend the concept to study behavior of the cartel as a whole, as is done here.
cournot The standard Cournot model, in which it is assumed that each producer takes the output of rivals as given, then equates its own marginal cost to perceived marginal revenue.
perfcomp
The perfectly competitive benchmark, in which no firm is large enough to have a perceptible impact on market price, and all firms act as price-takers. Smith (2003) demonstrates that if demand shocks are relatively small (which appears to be true of the sample considered here), then perfectly competitive firms would exhibit compensating production changes only by chance-roughly 50% of the time.
In addition to these implications of the traditional models of interdependent behavior, Smith (2003) considers one further, perhaps more realistic, model of collusive conduct. In contrast to the frictionless cartel, envision a collusive syndicate of producers who operate under the weight of transactions costs, i.e., a "bureaucratic cartel." In this model, any difficulty in reaching consensus on proposed output revisions (and the profit redistributions that would result) constitutes an added cost. Such transaction costs could easily outweigh whatever benefits would otherwise be achieved via output reallocation unless the scope of the proposed reallocation is substantial and expected to persist.
Moreover, the cost of reaching consensus is likely to be higher when the proposed adjustments are in offsetting directions rather than in parallel.
In consequence, the bureaucratic cartel would be expected to review output allocations, and perhaps change them, rather infrequently. Many temporary shocks that might cause members of a frictionless cartel to adjust production levels would rightfully be ignored until they accumulate to a degree that justifies the cost of taking a cooperative decision to revise the status quo. Compensating adjustments, especially, would tend to be suppressed due to the higher transaction costs they entail. The rational result would be a production record in which compensating output changes are less prevalent than in the case of a frictionless cartel.
To the previous results, we can then add: θ cartel > θ bureaucracy . Where the production record of the bureaucratic cartel might rank relative to the other forms of market conduct depends on the magnitude of transaction costs. If such costs are sufficiently large, it is possible that we could observe: 50% > θ bureaucracy . In other words, the bureaucratic cartel is the only form of interdependent behavior reviewed here that could conceivably fall on the "other side" of the perfectly competitive benchmark.
There is nominal evidence to suggest that, if OPEC does act as a cartel, then it must be of the second type. Production quotas are reviewed infrequently and changed only if relatively large shocks have disturbed the market during the interim. Throughout the twenty years during which OPEC has assigned individual quotas to each member, revisions have occurred less than twice per year, on average. 24 There are other indications as well that OPEC sometimes puts off the process of revising quotas even after the perceived benefits to the organization have become widely apparent. 25 This is a justifiable policy, of course, if the costs of adjustment threaten to outweigh the benefits.
Testable Hypotheses:
On the basis of the preceding discussion, it is possible to rank at least some market structures in terms of the predicted frequency of compensating production changes. Here we put forth several testable hypotheses that are relevant to the OPEC debate:
H1: OPEC members exhibit compensating production changes (measured vs. the rest of OPEC) no less frequently than non-OPEC (i.e., competitive) producers (measured vs. the rest of non-OPEC output).
Rejection of H1 would be inconsistent with the competitive, Cournot, BertrandEdgeworth, Stackelberg, and frictionless-cartel hypotheses. It would not be inconsistent with the bureaucratic-cartel hypothesis, but it would be indicative that transactions costs within OPEC are relatively high.
H2: OPEC members exhibit compensating production changes (measured vs. the rest OPEC and vs. non-OPEC output) no less frequently since the formal quota system was adopted than before.
Rejection of H2 would contradict the notion that introduction of the quota system has had no effect on the behavior of OPEC members, and would indicate that the quota system has tended to increase transactions costs within the cartel.
H3: OPEC members exhibit compensating production changes measured vs. the rest of OPEC no less frequently than they do vs. the output of non-OPEC producers.
Rejection of H3 would be inconsistent with the competitive hypothesis, but not necessarily inconsistent with the cartel or other oligopolistic hypotheses.
H4: Saudi Arabia exhibits compensating production changes (vs. output from the rest of OPEC and from non-OPEC producers) no more frequently than do other OPEC members.
Rejection of H4 would be inconsistent with the hypothesis that OPEC is an organization of equals always operating on a cooperative basis, and indicative of a special role (e.g., Stackelberg leader) played by the Saudis within OPEC.
V. Empirical Procedures
Data:
The data employed to perform these tests consist of the monthly crude oil It is debatable whether analysis of monthly or quarterly production changes would provide a better test of our hypotheses. Monthly reporting probably captures more random demand and supply shocks. This is not necessarily a disadvantage since all producers (OPEC and non-OPEC) are buffeted by monthly shocks and our theory attempts to identify systematic differences in the way that potential rivals react to such shocks. Of course, monthly reporting also provides three times as many observations.
On the other hand, quarterly figures might involve smaller reporting errors, which would reduce bias and enhance power. To be conservative, we report results based on monthly and quarterly observations. In fact, the two sets of results are remarkably similar.
Output changes are measured as follows:
where "i" designates a specific producer or producer group and "t" designates the period for which production is reported. Producer i is counted as having exhibited a compensating change vs. reference group j in any period for which:
The line of demarcation separating "pre-quota" and "quota" intervals is only approximate due to variations across time and countries in how the quota has been construed and enforced. The Saudis, for example, initially refused to formally acknowledge a quota for themselves , acting nominally as "swing producer" instead. Iraq has remained outside the quota system altogether since 1998. Despite relative frequency of compensating production changes over the interval from T 1 to T 2 can then be represented as f ij :
( ) , and zero otherwise.
We are looking for systematic differences in these frequencies for different types of pairings; for example when the frequency of compensating changes among OPEC members is compared to that among non-members; or when pre-quota OPEC behavior is compared to subsequent behavior. A simple F-test based on an ANOVA of observed frequencies would suffice, but for the apparent departure of the f ij (which are proportions) from a normal distribution. A standard remedy is to fit the observed proportions to a logistic regression model of the form:
where the X ij are variables that identify the type of pairing (producer, reference group, quota, etc.) and the β are parameters that represent the hypothesized differences in behavior depending on these characteristics. Under standard assumptions regarding the ε ij , we obtain unbiased and efficient estimates of β via Weighted Least Squares.
Empirical Results:
The data are summarized in Tables 1a (monthly observations) and 1b (quarterly observations). Each producer's behavior is tabulated according to time period (before aberrations like this, the procedural changes that were introduced in 1982 represent an important and after quota) and reference group of other producers (OPEC and non-OPEC). Table   entries record the percentage of total months (or quarters) in which compensating production changes are observed for the given pairing. For example, Indonesia's monthly production changes offset the change in the rest of OPEC 35.5% of the time prior to the implementation of OPEC's quota system, but only 27.0% of the time thereafter. The category "Rest of OPEC" consists of total OPEC production less the comparison country; i.e., total OPEC less Indonesia in the case just mentioned. The category "non-OPEC" output represents total world production net of OPEC and the production of any non-OPEC country involved in the comparison.
For non-OPEC producers, the entries in Tables 1a and 1b confirm our earlier conjecture: competitive producers exhibit compensating production changes nearly 50% of the time, as if the changes occurred by chance. This is true whether output variations of individual non-OPEC producers are being compared to variations from the rest of the non-OPEC world (the figures shown in Table 1 ), or simply to the production of other individual non-OPEC producers (not shown).
To determine whether behavior of OPEC members deviates significantly from that of non-OPEC (i.e., competitive) producers, we turn to the logistic regressions, which are summarized in Table 2 We begin with hypothesis H1. On average over the entire period (pre-and postquota), Table 1a (monthly data ) showed that OPEC members exhibit compensating behavior vs. the rest of OPEC 33.0% of the time, whereas non-OPEC members exhibit compensating behavior vs. non-OPEC output more frequently, 45.8% of the time. The negative coefficient of "OPEC" in Model 1a (see Table 2 ) proves this difference to be highly significant (99% confidence, one-tailed test) based on the monthly data.
Moreover, this result is confirmed by analysis of the quarterly data, where the t-statistic grows even larger (see Model 1b). We conclude that OPEC members have exhibited significantly less compensating behavior than their non-OPEC counterparts. This constitutes a strong rejection of H1, which implies also a strong rejection of the competitive, Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand-Edgeworth, and frictionless cartel models of OPEC behavior in favor of the bureaucratic-cartel alternative.
The first model also permits a test of the impact of the quota system (hypothesis H2). Because the quotas do not bind output of non-OPEC producers, the "Quota"
variable is introduced as an interaction effect that applies only to OPEC members and only after the quota was introduced. 27 Based on monthly data (Model 1a), the estimated coefficient is significantly less than zero (95% confidence), meaning that compensating behavior among OPEC producers occurred less frequently after March 1982. In contrast, compensating behavior among the control group of non-OPEC producers hardly varies between periods, 45.2% before vs. 46.4% after (see Table 1a ), which suggests that it was the quota system rather than changes in the broader market that tended to suppress compensating production changes within OPEC. Based on these results from the monthly data, H2 would be rejected.
The quarterly data tell a somewhat different story about the quota. Based on Model 1b, the quota system appears to have had little or no effect on the frequency with which OPEC members offset variations from the rest of OPEC. As noted when testing H1, less compensating behavior is seen among OPEC producers than among non-OPEC producers, but the magnitude of that difference is (according to the quarterly data) not affected by introduction of the quota. How to resolve the conflict between monthly and quarterly results? It may be that the quarterly data are freer of reporting errors and provide a more accurate picture. That interpretation will be challenged, however, by some further results we come to later. For the moment, the apparent contradiction must remain a puzzle.
We move now to the second model for a test of H3, the hypothesis that OPEC producers offset (internal) changes in the output of the rest of OPEC no less frequently than they offset (external) changes in non-OPEC production. The monthly and quarterly data agree completely in this regard: hypothesis H3 is strongly rejected, as indicated by the significant positive coefficients associated with the variable "v NOPEC" in Models 2a
and 2b. Evidently, OPEC producers are much more likely to offset output changes that originate outside the group than those that come from within. This aspect of OPEC behavior is inconsistent with the competitive hypothesis, but entirely consistent with the 27 When a separate term is introduced in the equation to show the response of non-OPEC producers to the quota, it is indistinguishable from zero. To save space we report only the results where that term is behavior of a bureaucratic cartel that incurs relatively high transaction costs whenever market shares shift within the cartel.
The second model also revisits the impact of the quota system, this time weighing both internal and external adjustments together: OPEC producers became significantly less likely to offset production changes (whether emanating from within or without) after quotas were introduced. This is demonstrated by the highly significant (99% confidence) negative coefficients on the "Quota" variables in Models 2a and 2b. It may be possible, through more extensive use of dummy variables and further partitioning of the sample period, to more clearly identify the impact of the quota system. A case in point is Iraq, which has been exempt from the quota system since July 1998. While subject to quotas in previous quarters, Iraq had exhibited compensating changes relative to the rest of OPEC 30.8% of the time, but since its exemption this has risen to 50%-virtually indistinguishable from the group of non-OPEC producers, who are of course also exempt from quotas.
On balance, the evidence regarding the quota system strongly suggests that it has had the effect of increasing transaction costs-perhaps more so for certain types of production adjustments than others. But, the finding of increased transactions cost should not come as a surprise, even for those who would have expected the formalization of this control device to have enhanced cartel operations. It hardly seems implausible that the process of reaching consensus became more problematic once each member's stake in the outcome had to be set forth explicitly and mutually agreed.
There are certain indications in the raw data (see Tables 1a and 1b) Although the proponents of competitive, cooperative, and oligopolistic hypotheses have all had their say, little consensus has yet been reached regarding the 28 There is no appreciable change in the coefficients of these equations or their significance levels when the output of non-Saudi members are compared to the rest of non-Saudi-OPEC. Moreover, when the Saudi dummy variable is dropped from the equation, the results are again essentially unchanged. To save space, those results are not reported here. 29 Some ambiguity exists in the literature regarding the terms "swing producer" and "residual supplier." These are often construed to mean that one producer offsets variations in the output of others to whatever extent may be needed to "defend" a pre-determined price level. In this sense, a profit-maximizing dominant firm is not a swing producer because its optimal price varies with the production levels adopted by the others. A swing producer or residual supplier, defined as above, should exhibit compensating production changes more often than a dominant firm or Stackelberg leader, since the response of the swing producer to fluctuations in output of the fringe is not damped by the countervailing change in optimal price. nature and influence of OPEC. The lingering debate undoubtedly stems from many factors, and may encounter new obstacles as events in the world oil market continue to unfold. One point seems clear, however: research to date has been inconclusive in part due to the relatively low power of statistical tests employed.
Performance-based tests of market structure are, at least concerning the world oil market, inherently difficult because they must overcome a relatively high degree of uncertainty regarding the magnitude of marginal costs and the structure of demand, and they are complicated by the necessity of distinguishing Ricardian rents (and perhaps user costs) from monopoly profits. Accordingly, we have devised tests based on behavioral predictions that are largely invariant with respect to unknown values of these background parameters.
When these tests are applied to the members of OPEC and their rivals, the results are quite clear: OPEC is much more than a non-cooperative oligopoly, but much less than a frictionless cartel. All traditional explanations of OPEC behavior (i.e., competitive, Cournot, dominant-firm, etc.) are strongly rejected, except the hypothesis that OPEC acts as a bureaucratic cartel; i.e., a cooperative enterprise weighed down by the cost of forging consensus among members, and therefore partially impaired in pursuit of the common good. The evidence also suggests that OPEC's formal quota system, introduced in 1982 to replace the old posted-price scheme, has increased transactions costs within the organization and pushed behavior further away from the ideal of a pure and frictionless cartel. Whether that also means that the quota system failed to enhance the performance of the cartel is unclear. Sample: Each of eleven OPEC members vs. output from the rest of OPEC, and each of six non-OPEC producers vs. output from the rest of non-OPEC; before and after the quota was introduced. Sample: Each of eleven OPEC members vs. output from rest of OPEC and vs. output from non-OPEC; before and after the quota was introduced.
APPENDIX
The Precision of Marginal Cost Estimates
Adelman and Shahi (1989) estimate development and operating cost ($/barrel) on an annual basis over the interval 1970-85 for each OPEC member country. 30 In fact, they provide two figures, one estimate adjusted for the prevalence of offshore operations in each country (see their Table 10 .5) and one estimate unadjusted by this factor (Table   10 .4). The estimates for each country vary from year to year, substantially in some cases.
As Adelman and Shahi point out, annual variations may be due in part to the phenomenon of reservoir depletion and in part to innovations in technology. Another source of variation comes simply from the random fluctuations in drilling results, expenditure levels, factor prices, reporting methods and classification errors, etc. that enter each year, directly or indirectly, into the cost estimation process.
To assess the magnitude of these random factors, I proceed as follows. The true marginal cost of development for a given country is unobservable, but may be assumed to vary smoothly from year to year, following a quadratic function over the period 1970-85.
The quadratic form is general enough to permit rising, then falling costs if technological progress is sufficient to overcome the effects of depletion, or vice versa. After fitting the annual Adelman-Shahi cost estimates to a quadratic function, country-by-country, the "residuals" serve as a proxy for the random sources of variation. Based on these residuals, there are two ways to estimate the coefficient of variation: (1) after converting the residual errors to percentage terms, then calculate the standard deviation of the errors over the sample period, or (2) divide the standard error of the estimated equation by the 30 Adelman and Shahi also provide estimates for some prior years, but the coverage is sketchy prior to 1970.
average cost for the whole period. The second method produces a smaller estimate of the coefficient of variation in this instance, and to be conservative in my own argument I report only those results here. 
